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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In June 2002, the Department of Health published its draft mental health bill.
2
 
This was the latest stage in processes commencing in 1998, and consolidating two 
different agendas of reform.  The first was based in the Fallon report into conditions at 
Ashworth special hospital.  That report considered a broader mandate than the 
specifics at that hospital however, and proposed that „dangerous persons with 
personality disorders‟ be able to be detained indefinitely, whether or not they were 
treatable.
3
  This recommendation was largely accepted by the Department of Health 
and Home Office in a green paper in 1999.
4
 Mental health reform more generally also 
commenced in 1998, with the appointment of an expert panel chaired by Professor 
Genevra Richardson.
5
   It too proceeded to a green paper in 1999,
6
 although one 
which challenged many of the conclusions and proposals of the expert panel.  Mental 
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health and personality disorder reforms were then consolidated, and a joint white 
paper issued in 2000.
7
   
 
Through this process, the government managed to achieve a consensus rarely 
seen in mental health politics.  Sadly, the consensus was negative:  virtually no one 
supported the draft bill.
8
 
 
 Such antagonism is not without justification, as the bill is certainly badly 
flawed.  The consensus view however avoids the different question of how mental law 
ought to be reformed, and on this there is no obvious consensus.  This paper begins to 
address this question, considering capacity, a rights-informed therapeutic criterion and 
dangerousness as alternative possible standards. 
 
II. PSYCHIATRY AS SOCIAL CONTROL 
 
Much of the resistance to the government bill seems to be based on the 
removal of the existing treatability test for people with psychopathic disorders.  The 
perception is that such persons might be maintained in psychiatric facilities if 
treatment were not available.  Along with the perceived re-focussing of the bill onto 
dangerousness from treatment, the fear is that it will turn psychiatrists into agents of 
social control.   
 
These concerns are problematic for several reasons.  Admittedly, the 
government has done itself no favours by highlighting particular issues relating to 
personality disorder and the protection of the public from danger during reform 
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process.  That focus during the consultation process makes it unsurprising that the 
issues have arisen in public discussion.  It is less obvious how far the proposals 
change the status quo.  While the government‟s draft bill does include a new clause 
concerning confinement of persons „at substantial risk of causing serious harm to 
other persons‟,9 it is not obvious how far this extends the powers to confine „with a 
view to the protection of others‟ in the 1983 statute and repeated in the draft bill.10  
 
The draft bill does, certainly, remove the requirement under the 1983 Act that 
„psychopaths‟ and persons with (non-severe) „mental impairment‟ may only be 
detained beyond twenty-eight days if treatment is available to alleviate or prevent a 
deterioration of their condition.
11
 This largely brings them into conformity with other 
mental disorders, and specifically persons classified as having „mental illness‟, a 
diagnosis accounting for roughly 97 per cent of psychiatric admissions.  The objection 
appears to be coherent only if viewed as a specific concern relating to personality 
disorder, since there has been no objection to the removal of the requirement as it 
applies to people with mental impairment. On that basis, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that the argument ought to be whether personality disorders ought to be 
excluded from the bill entirely, rather than to argue for the maintenance of an 
enhanced treatability standard.  This seems a particularly convincing question, since 
predicted treatability of a given psychopath seems to a significant degree dependent 
on the psychiatrist engaged in diagnosis.  This risks turning the compulsion of 
psychopaths into a lottery. 
 
The concerns are also problematic on theoretical grounds, insofar as they 
suggest that psychiatry can avoid social control.  The reality is that psychiatric 
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treatment in any situation other than by free and competent consent of the patient is 
by its nature about social control. The vast bulk of people currently confined in 
psychiatric facilities are categorised as 'mentally ill', and for them there is no 
requirement of treatability.  Most of them are treatable of course, but that does not 
remove the social control function.  They tend to be admitted when their behaviour 
becomes socially unacceptable; and they are treated until it is no longer unacceptable.  
Alternatively, they are admitted when they are perceived to be unable to cope or 
function in society, and treated until they can be discharged, able to do so. When such 
behavioural features are significant factors in clinical decision-making, doctors are 
acting as agents of social control.   
 
This is not of course necessarily an undesirable outcome.  One need only 
peruse the published accounts of former patients to realise how much better life gets 
for many people after psychiatric treatment, but that does not change the fact that it 
remains the imposition of social control.  This is not just a function of law, as such; it 
is what psychiatry does.  It changes who people are, one hopes usually in desirable 
ways.   
 
To abolish the social control function of psychiatry, we would need to prohibit 
psychiatric treatment on any but competent and freely consenting patients.  This 
would, obviously, be an undesirable restriction, since those who lack capacity and 
might be in particular need of psychiatric services would nonetheless be precluded 
from receiving them.  The intrusiveness of the interventions, along with their socially 
controlling nature, do mean that the level of standards must not simply be left to 
medical discretion.  The interests at stake are also both political and social, and 
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therefore must be articulated in a clear and binding legal framework.  The intrinsic 
argument to that effect is buttressed by our international commitments:  a clear legally 
binding structure is required by the European Convention on Human Rights.
12
 In 
practice, that means a standard contained in a statute.  The current fetish for Codes of 
Practice must be viewed with scepticism here.  Including the substantive standards for 
compulsion in such a code in a mental health context makes no more sense than 
legislating in a criminal context that police officers may arrest people who do bad 
things, and providing illustrative or non-binding „guidance‟ in a code of practice as to 
what bad things might be.  It is not good enough.  It must be clear from the statute 
itself what the standards of intervention are. 
 
The proper question is therefore not how psychiatrists can cease to be agents 
of social control: they cannot.  The better question, to be asked bluntly, is when the 
social control is justified.  The squeamishness of critics of the government bill to 
engage with that question does not help.  The reality is that we need mental health 
legislation, and we must therefore choose from a set of criteria of administration, all 
of which are problematic.  The acknowledgement that mental health law is about 
social control allows that choice to be made in a fashion which acknowledges the 
individual and social interests at stake, in a way which acknowledges appropriate 
policy concerns and the need for a system which will actually function in practice.   
 
III. THE STATUS QUO AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
 
 There can be little doubt that reform of mental health law is desirable.  It is 
now twenty years since the last comprehensive revisions, introduced as amendments 
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to an act passed in 1959.  That act in turn constituted a synthesis of statutes reaching 
back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.  Since 1983, there has been additional 
piecemeal reform, in particular the introduction of aftercare under supervision in 
1995.
13
  The Mental Health Act 1983 is thus a scrappy and sometimes incoherent 
result of two centuries of cut and paste.   
 
Much has changed since the 1983 amendments.  Key in theses changes are the 
increasing acknowledgment that patients, be they formally or informally admitted, 
have a role in their treatment.  The patient user movement, still a novelty in 1983, has 
grown in maturity and is now an accepted part of the policy landscape, and individual 
patient-doctor relations have changed to reflect this.  Under the 1983 Act, for 
example, the patient has no right to information during the first three months of 
confinement as to the treatment being performed on him or her.
14
  It is difficult to 
imagine any clinician supporting such an approach now.  In the academic and policy 
literature more broadly, there is now discussion of rights to determine psychiatric 
treatment in advance, choice of decision-makers in the event of subsequent 
incapacity, substitute judgment tests in preference to clinical best interests tests, and 
other similar mechanisms to ensure that the patient‟s views are reflected in psychiatric 
treatment.  The culture of psychiatric practice is still in a process of change, and may 
not have changed as much as some would wish, but change in the last twenty years is 
undeniable.   
 
Non-discrimination on the basis of disability, including mental disability, has 
entered the public, legal and academic consciousness in a way which could not have 
been anticipated twenty years ago.  This broader acceptance is reflected at the 
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legislative level in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
1997, and European charter signed at Nice,
15
 and, potentially most importantly, in the 
proposed new European constitution.
16
  
 
There are further structural changes.  The 1959 Act had been drafted on the 
expectation that treatment would be provided increasingly, indeed predominantly, in 
the community.  Numbers of psychiatric in-patient beds were already falling at that 
time, a process that has continued unabated since.  At the same time, numbers of 
admissions have continued to rise on an annual basis, and lengths of individual stays 
have correspondingly fallen dramatically.   
 
In policy terms, it is often said that risk has been introduced onto the policy 
agenda in this period.  This claim is somewhat difficult to make out in any simplistic 
way, since dangerousness has been a part of the English landscape of legal psychiatry 
for some four hundred years, and numbers of homicides by persons with mental 
disorder have been falling fairly steadily for decades.
17
  It is tempting to speculate that 
what has changed is that tabloids more than ever before have discovered that 
dangerous people with mental disorder sell newspapers, and certainly the obsession of 
news media in modern times with associating dangerousness and mental disorder has 
been documented.
18
  Nonetheless, there has been a revival in academic and political 
interest about risk analyses of persons with mental disorder. 
 
To a modern eye, the standards provided by the Act are exceptionally loose.  
Under section 2 of the Act, for example, a person can be admitted under compulsion 
for periods up to twenty-eight days if suffering from a „mental disorder of a nature or 
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degree which warrants the detention of the patient in hospital for assessment‟ and „he 
ought to be so detained in the interests of his own health or safety or with a view to 
the protection of others.‟  This provides little guidance to professionals as to who 
should, and who should not be admitted.  In practice, standards have for some time 
been a function of professional culture rather than law,
19
 coupled with continued 
chronic under-funding.  This latter has placed considerable restrictions on the number 
of persons confined at a given time, introducing standards indirectly by way of 
rationing.   
 
Such an approach is not appropriate.  Current mental health law allows not 
only forcible confinement of the individual, but also their treatment with 
exceptionally powerful chemicals and sometimes electricity.  The methods used to 
effect the cures are extremely intrusive, and have as their objective fundamental 
changes to the individual.  Medical discourse may distinguish between individuals 
and their conditions, but treatments for depression may result in astonishing mood 
changes accompanied by corresponding changes to attitudes to self, and removal of 
psychosis changes the phenomenal world in which the individual lives.  This is not 
merely social control, but social control of a particularly invasive kind, causing 
fundamental change to individuals‟ experience of day-to-day life.  The frequent 
beneficial effects of psychiatric treatments are to be acknowledged, but in legal terms, 
current English mental health law claims powers more sweeping in their effect on the 
individual than any other area of law.  Not even criminal law, after all, allows 
compulsory treatment without consent of persons with capacity.  As a matter of basic 
civil rights, the law must establish clear and appropriate standards.  It is difficult to 
see that a standard that allows confinement and enforced medication on the basis of a 
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mental disorder which „warrants detention‟ of the individual for his or her „health‟ 
meets such a threshold.  The world has moved on since this standard was introduced 
in the 1950s.
20
 
 
 If reform is required, and a meaningful standard of compulsion introduced, 
what should it look like?  In the sections which follow, it will be argued that capacity 
should form a cornerstone to the standard regarding enforced treatment – indeed, that 
this is becoming a norm expected under European human rights law, with which 
England should be expected to comply.  That leaves the problem of criteria for 
admission to psychiatric facilities.  Here, some commentators have also suggested a 
role for capacity, and that will be considered.  In addition, a therapeutic model will be 
discussed, as well as a standard of dangerousness. 
 
IV. CAPACITY AND TREATMENT DECISIONS 
 
The use of capacity to determine the rights of persons with mental disorder has 
the advantage of emphasising a non-discriminatory approach:  in the same way that 
we may treat without further consent people who lack capacity to consent to somatic 
disorders,
21
 so psychiatric decisions could be made for those lacking capacity.  The 
social control implications of compulsions, unpopular with psychiatric professionals, 
are similarly minimised.  In the best tradition of anti-discrimination law, the disability 
is acknowledged insofar as it is relevant to decision-making, but left outside the 
equation otherwise.   
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 The use of mental capacity as a gateway concept for compulsion is gaining 
popularity in the academic literature in Britain.
22
 The Richardson Committee further 
used it as one part of compulsion criteria, although it would not in itself have been 
sufficient to justify compulsion.
23
  The government however retreated from that 
recommendation, and it is nowhere to be found in the white paper or draft bill.  The 
substantive issue in the next sections of this paper is how far capacity may be used as 
a gateway for compulsion in a mental health context. 
 
 English mental health law already recognises the authority of the competent 
voluntary patient to make treatment decisions.  Indeed, the Code of Practice under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 provides specific guidance on the determination of capacity 
and its use in a treatment context.
24
  It is only when competent patients are subject to 
involuntary admission that they lose their right to consent to treatment under the 1983 
Act.
25
  For the first three months in which treatment is provided to them, these 
patients have no right to refuse treatment at all; after this period, their refusal to 
consent may be overridden by their responsible medical officer, with the agreement of 
a second doctor, specially appointed for the purpose by the Mental Health Act 
Commission. 
 
 Other jurisdictions have gone considerably further, however.  In Ontario, for 
example, the rule has been established that no patients with capacity may be treated 
without his or her informed consent.
26
 This applies equally to somatic or psychiatric 
treatment, whether or not the person is in hospital or in the community, and if in 
hospital, whether formally or informally admitted.  This standard was introduced 
under threat of constitutional litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms in 1986, much to the chagrin of the province‟s psychiatrists.  It appears now 
to have been accepted into the professional culture however, and there are few if any 
serious suggestions that it should be changed. 
 
 The usual objection to separating enforced treatment from enforced admission 
is the possibility that individuals will be admitted involuntarily, but refuse treatment 
once admitted.  Their health, according to the concern, would not improve; the 
hospital would become a warehouse for such patients, and psychiatrists little better 
than gaolers.  Whatever the theoretical possibilities the system presents, there is no 
indication that this is happening to any marked degree in Ontario.  While statistics on 
those refusing all treatment do not appear to be kept, anecdotal evidence suggests 
these patients number few indeed.  Certainly, some patients consent to medication 
which is not considered by their psychiatrist to be optimal, but in practice what seems 
to happen is that psychiatrist and patient negotiate a solution that both can live with.  
This seems to be a desirable approach.  Indeed, it is a reasonable speculation that it 
leads to a greater personal commitment to the treatment programme by patients, and 
accordingly better treatment concordance in the long term.
27
   
 
 Given the appropriate political will, there would be no obvious reason that this 
approach could not be implemented in England.  It is submitted that this would be 
appropriate.  The violation of autonomy consequent on enforced treatment of a person 
with capacity is considerable.  The introduction of psychiatric medication into an 
individual‟s body results in fundamental and substantial changes to the person‟s self.  
These changes are, of course, the objective of the treatment, and have social benefits.  
Many patients will also willingly consent to them, as they are perceived to have 
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benefits to them too.  That in no way alters the extraordinary nature of the 
intervention, however, and it is difficult to see that it should be provided on a patient 
with capacity who refuses it. 
 
 This is also, increasingly, the view of the Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture, the body established by the Council of Europe to police the right in Article 3 
of the ECHR to be free of torture or (as at issue for current purposes) inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  The words of their guidance phrase the matter as follows: 
 
Patients should, as a matter of principle, be placed in a position to give their 
free and informed consent to treatment.  The admission of a person to a 
psychiatric establishment on an involuntary basis should not be construed as 
authorising treatment without his consent.  It follows that every competent 
patient, whether voluntary or involuntary, should be given the opportunity to 
refuse treatment or other medical intervention.  Any derogation from this 
fundamental principle should be based upon law and only relate to clearly and 
strictly defined exceptional circumstances.
28
 
 
It seems reasonable to expect England to conform to this norm.  The matter has 
already had an initial airing before the Court of Appeal, with an inconclusive result.  
In R (Wilkinson) v. RMO Broadmoor,
29
 the Article 3 point was put directly to the 
court.  Simon Brown LJ was broadly sympathetic: 
 
If in truth this appellant has the capacity to refuse consent to the treatment 
proposed here, it is difficult to suppose that he should nevertheless be forcibly 
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subjected to it.    True, Dr Horne appears to regard it as his only hope of 
eventual return to the community.   That said, however, its impact on the 
appellant‟s rights above all to autonomy and bodily inviolability is immense  
and its prospective benefits (not least given his extreme opposition) appear 
decidedly speculative.
30
 
 
Brooke LJ took no position on the point.  Hale LJ took a contrary view: 
 
I do not take the view that detained patients who have the capacity to decide 
for themselves can never be treated against their will. Our threshold of 
capacity is rightly a low one. It is better to keep it that way and allow some 
non-consensual treatment of those who have capacity than to set such a high 
threshold for capacity that many would never qualify.
31
 
 
The difficulty with the view of Hale L.J. is that the threshold of capacity in England is 
not low at all.  Indeed, it is exceptionally high.  The individual is not merely required 
to have the ability to understand the information given, but also to appreciate it, that 
is, to be able to identify „relevant‟ information, and to „weigh it in the balance as part 
of the process of arriving at a decision.‟32  The reported case law further suggests a 
marked hesitancy of courts to affirm a patient‟s capacity when treatment is refused.33  
There are no obvious moves afoot to lower this standard of capacity.  On this basis, 
the view of Hale LJ seems unconvincing. 
 
 The adoption of a standard allowing competent patients control of their 
treatment of course has considerable ramifications for the nature of community 
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treatment orders.  For patients lacking capacity, such orders would seem to add little, 
as existing incapacity law already allows the treatment of such patients.  For patients 
with capacity, it is not obvious that there would be room for such an order, since if it 
is not justified to treat a such patient in a psychiatric facility without consent, it would 
be manifestly unjustified to do so outside the facility.  Such a loss is not necessarily a 
problem even in therapeutic terms, for it is debatable whether such treatment orders 
are effective. 
 
V. CAPACITY AND ADMISSIONS 
 
 While the use of capacity rather than confinement status as the arbiter of 
treatment rights appears to be becoming best legal practice, a similar movement does 
not seem to have occurred in the area of confinement.  While persons without 
capacity may often be able to be admitted without resort to formal compulsion, I am 
aware of no system that adopts an incapacity standard to the exclusion of another 
standard of formal admission. Ontario uses a dangerousness standard, for example, 
and for the Richardson Committee, capacity formed only one part of a more complex 
set of standards of compulsion.  The question for this section of the paper is whether a 
capacity standard can apply here too. 
 
 Issues relating to the psychiatric institutionalisation of people lacking capacity 
have been litigated before both the Supreme Court of the United States
34
 and the 
House of Lords
35
 in recent years. The cases concerned similar points:  was it legal to 
admit informally a patient who lacked the capacity to consent to psychiatric 
admission.  The House of Lords in the Bournewood decision held that such 
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admissions were legal, albeit for unconvincing reasons.
36
  The case is currently on 
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.  The core of the American decision in 
Zinermon turned on the wording of the relevant state statute, which the court held did 
require capacity prior to admission.  Blackmun J writing for the majority went further, 
however, holding that the informal admission of persons lacking capacity to consent 
to admission was unconstitutional.
37
 
 
Such intensive litigation makes it surprising that there are few articles 
examining what precisely capacity to consent to psychiatric admission entails.
38
 This 
is not an abstract question, for capacity in common law jurisdictions is a functional 
concept.  Capacity always has an object: one is capable of doing or engaging in a 
specific task, relationship or decision, and capacity or not to consent to treatment will 
be established on a different set of criteria than to consent to psychiatric admission.  
What exactly, therefore, ought one be capable of knowing in order to have capacity to 
consent to psychiatric admission?
39
 
 
 The American literature includes a range of proposed tests.  Appelbaum and 
Bateman‟s 1979 paper proposes a high threshold:  
 
1. Does the patient appreciate the nature of his condition?  
a. Does he recognise that he has a mental illness?  
b. Does he think that he requires treatment?  
c. Does he know of a reasonable alternative to hospitalisation?  
 
2. Does the patient understand the nature of hospitalization?  
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a. Does he understand the role of his doctor?  
b. Does he understand the role of medication, if indicated?  
c. Does he understand the nature of an inpatient setting, such as an 
understanding that there will be closed and open wards, and activities and 
programmes available? 
 
3. Is the patient able to comprehend the basis for the doctor‟s recommendations 
concerning admission? 
 
4. Is the patient able to make a decision to co-operate with his doctor‟s 
recommendations?  
 
5. Can the patient act affirmatively to protect himself in the hospital 
environment? For example, if the patient were experiencing adverse effects, 
would he know to approach a member of staff? 
 
6. Is the patient aware of rights as voluntary patient, including 
a. right to file request for discharge; 
b. right to refuse medication; 
c. right to legal representation; 
d. aware of existence of civil rights advisor in hospital. 
 
7. Is the patient aware of adverse consequences that might result from 
admission?  This would include an awareness of potential of involuntary 
detention if he requests discharge? 
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At the other extreme, the test favoured by the American Psychiatric Association and 
most authors in the last ten years, Appelbaum included, is remarkably low.  The APA 
would require that the patient understand that he or she is being admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital or ward for treatment, and that release from the hospital may not 
be automatic, and he or she can get help from the staff to initiate procedures for 
release.
40
 
 
 The American literature is of limited assistance as it is intended to co-exist 
with a separate standard of involuntary admission such as a dangerousness standard. 
In the 1979 Appelbaum and Bateman paper, the concern was that even informal 
psychiatric admissions had consequences, and that acceptance of those consequences 
required a level of capacity.  These concerns may also have been implicit in the 
Zinermon case in 1990.  The more recent American literature can be seen as 
attempting to ensure in the light of this ruling that potential patients wishing 
admission, or at least not objecting thereto, should not be precluded by an overly 
onerous threshold.   
 
If capacity is to serve as the sole threshold of compulsion, the dynamic will of 
course be very different.  Persons found capable under the American system would 
still be compellable; this would not be the case if incapacity became the threshold of 
compulsion in England.  The co-existence of a separate compulsion threshold makes a 
number of the criteria in the American test nonsensical.  Thus the American literature 
argues for the necessity of understanding rights to release, to be competent to decide 
admission.  Such a result would be paradoxical if incapacity is to be the threshold of 
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confinement, since the failure to understand the rights to release would result in a 
finding of incapacity and potentially confinement, in turn resulting in the loss of those 
same rights to release.  Similarly, some American formulations require the patient to 
understand that the voluntary admission could become involuntary, if an attempt was 
made to leave.  That would not be the case if incapacity were the threshold of 
compulsion. 
 
 Some of Appelbaum and Bateman‟s 1979 criteria are helpful.  What is 
proposed is an admission to a psychiatric facility, for example, so competent 
individuals would clearly need to be capable of understanding that.  It seems 
reasonable that they would need to understand that admission was proposed because 
of mental illness.  They would thus presumably need to understand that they would be 
living in the facility, at least until such time as they changed their mind and decided to 
leave, and that might well entail an understanding of the inpatient setting, as 
Appelbaum and Bateman suggest.   It seems reasonable also to expect some 
understanding of the roles of doctors and nurses in the facility, and some 
understanding of the reasons admission is proposed.  As Appelbaum and Bateman 
note at various points in their paper, comprehension cannot necessarily mean 
complete agreement with medical staff; but their list may provide at least a helpful 
starting point in understanding the range of issues relevant to capacity.   
 
The list conceals a variety of complexities, however.  In the usual case, it will 
be expected that the individual would receive treatment in the facility, and  
Appelbaum and Bateman go so far as to include an understanding of the right to 
refuse treatment in their criteria (6b, above).  This is too simplistic, since some 
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patients will capacity to consent to treatment, and these patients will not have a right 
to refuse treatment.  Is it necessary that the individual be competent to consent to 
treatment, in order to consent to the admission?  Presumably not, since the functional 
approach to capacity and the argument for capacity as the determinant of treatment 
rights implicitly separate treatment decisions from admission decisions. Removing 
treatment from the equation for most patients would however mean that their capacity 
to decide their own admission would not necessarily imply an understanding of the 
prime purpose for their admission.   
 
Ought the requirement be restricted to an understanding that treatment will be 
available if they wish it?  If so, how do we understand admission capacity for those 
without treatment capacity?  Would they need to understand that they would be 
treated without their consent following admission, in order to have capacity to decide 
the admission? Neither result here seems desirable.  If such understanding were not 
required for admission capacity, an otherwise competent individual could refuse 
admission, perhaps to avoid the treatment to which ex hypothesi they are unable to 
consent.  If the treatment could only be offered in the facility, that would effectively 
allow them to make the treatment decision through the back door.  If instead the 
patient were found to lack capacity to consent to the admission, then other real 
objections to admission could be overridden and the patient admitted, even if, for 
example, the treatment could also be given (albeit less conveniently) outside the 
facility.  
 
In their seventh question, Appelbaum and Bateman acknowledge that informal 
psychiatric admission carries with it consequences.  The range of these is more 
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substantial than they identify, however.  It is not merely the risk of a transfer to 
involuntary status that is relevant, but also social risks, including discrimination, 
stigma, potential child custody issues and potential loss of employment or housing.
41
  
To what degree does the patient have to understand those social results in order to be 
competent to be admitted voluntarily? 
 
This all applies when the question of admission capacity is limited to an 
understanding of what is entailed by psychiatric admission.  To be realistic, however, 
a refusal to enter a psychiatric facility implies another choice of care and 
accommodation.  This may be the continuation of the status quo, but if a family or 
group home is refusing to allow the individual to remain without a period in 
psychiatric care, refusal of psychiatric admission may instead involve the need to 
negotiate some new and other form of care arrangement. It is at least arguable that 
when refusal of psychiatric admission will result in such negotiations, the 
determination of capacity to decide on psychiatric admission may require 
consideration of ability to pursue those negotiations. In that event, consideration of 
capacity to remain in the community may include issues of capacity to seek out and 
enter care relationships such as with meal providers and home help, and capacity to 
manage ones accommodation. Is it further relevant whether the relevant social service 
agencies are agreeable to providing services under the circumstances, rendering the 
person of marginal capacity a compliant user, or whether the social services agency is 
refusing to provide the services, in which case active negotiation by the individual 
may be required? Capacity is a difficult measure to use in such circumstances, since it 
is intended to assess an individual‟s abilities, in English law the abilities to 
understand, retain and appreciate the importance of relevant information, to use it to 
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reach a decision, and to communicate the decision.  It feels wrong to have the 
determination of an individual‟s capacity at least partly contingent for example on 
whether the services of the social service agency are offered willingly or only after 
negotiation.  This may nonetheless be unavoidable here, as the functional test of 
capacity relates to the decisions actually to be made by the individual.   
 
Does the determination of capacity to decide psychiatric admission also 
include the capacity to understand the risks of social interactions in the community 
that may flow from ones disorder?  To put it another way, does it include a 
requirement that the individual understand his or her level of dangerousness? 
Presumably it must.  Otherwise, people with psychiatric disabilities who were thought 
to be dangerous as a result of a psychiatric disorder, even if the predictive value of 
that was fairly good, could remain uncontrolled without understanding the 
dangerousness of their situation.  It is difficult to see a judge reaching such a result.   
 
This result poses considerable difficulties for those who advocate a capacity 
test in preference to a dangerousness test, since it would seem that a dangerousness 
test enters implicitly.  Unlike a well-drafted statutory dangerousness test, however, 
there is little to define this back-door dangerousness test.  It is likely to be 
impressionistic by the psychiatrist, and difficult to challenge.  In practice, the concern 
of users regarding capacity tests is that people are found capable if and only if they 
agree with the views of their physician.  If patient lawyers are to find themselves 
arguing about dangerousness in any event, it is to the advantage of their clients that it 
is done according to a clear statutory structure.   
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 At least in theory, if a capacity test were adopted, a person who acknowledges 
their dangerousness might be able nonetheless to decline psychiatric admission.  They 
might say that they acknowledged their dangerousness, but preferred to run the risk of 
harming themselves or others in the community rather than consenting to psychiatric 
admission.  This possibility would undoubtedly make the current government hesitant 
about allowing such a test to be used.  An actual case would also place considerable 
pressure on a court to bend the rules to deny capacity.  This raises the other difficulty 
of capacity: it is an extremely slippery concept, and courts have in the past been 
willing to tailor the concept to their desired result.  Obvious recent cases of this in a 
treatment context involve pregnant women, religious objections to blood transfusions, 
and force-feeding of individuals.
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 For a meaningful standard of admission to be 
obtained, a clearer standard needs to be legislated than seems likely with capacity. 
 
 If a capacity standard were used, there would therefore be considerable 
pressure to make it a very high capacity standard.  At this point, the analogous 
concerns to those expressed about capacity and treatment by Hale L.J. become 
relevant.  Under the current system, with its separate standard for compulsion, there is 
no corresponding pressure towards a high standard of admission capacity.  I am aware 
of no empirical study as to the standard actually used currently by clinicians.  
Assuming (as seems likely) that it is below that which would apply if capacity were 
the standard for compulsion, there is now a class of people whose refusals to enter 
hospital are being honoured, who would lose that right in a system based solely on 
capacity.  For advocates of patient autonomy, this is an undesirable result. 
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 The use of capacity as a threshold for involuntary admission appears 
extremely attractive on the surface.  It does reflect what is used for somatic 
treatments, and as such makes problems of discrimination disappear.  This approach 
would however require that all aspects of the capacity test be satisfied:  incapacity on 
any one relevant factor (eg, self-appraisal of dangerousness) would result in a finding 
of incapacity.  It risks becoming a hard test to pass, and an easy one to fail.  This is 
particularly true in English law, which sets the thresholds of capacity relatively high, 
requiring understanding, retention and appreciation of knowledge, ability to use it in 
reaching a decision, and the ability to communicate the decision.  The courts in 
England have a tradition of deference to medical professionals, particularly in 
psychiatric situations, and a desire to behave paternalistically to psychiatric patients.  
It is likely therefore that most of the ambiguous issues above would be incorporated 
into a test of capacity, raising the threshold for the patient. Capacity might well be a 
hard test for a potential patient to satisfy.
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 The introduction of a capacity threshold of course begs the question as to how 
decisions would be made for those lacking capacity, a question that arises both for 
treatment decisions and admission decisions.  The Richardson Committee proposed a 
variety of criteria.  The requirements that a serious mental disorder be present, the 
principle of least restrictive alternative, and a best interests test would apply to all 
potential patients under compulsion, but additional criteria would be specific to 
whether or not the individual had capacity.  Those lacking capacity would be subject 
to the following additional criteria: 
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That, in the case of a patient who lacks capacity to consent to care and 
treatment for mental disorder, it is necessary for the health or safety of the 
patient or for the protection of others from serious harm or for the protection 
of the patient from serious exploitation that s/he be subject to such care and 
treatment, and that such care and treatment cannot be implemented unless s/he 
is compelled under this section.
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Reflecting the additional autonomy interest accorded to the reasoning subject in 
liberal theory, persons with capacity would be subject to more stringent standards of 
confinement.  Richardson proposed that they would be compellable if there were a 
substantial risk of serious harm to the safety of others (or perhaps to the patient)
45
 if 
he or she remained untreated, and there were positive clinical measures to be provided 
which would prevent deterioration or secure improvement of the patient‟s condition.46 
 
 The temptation in drafting additional compulsion criteria for persons lacking 
capacity is to set the standards relatively low, to ensure that people who are helpless 
and vulnerable may be protected.  If, however, the threshold of capacity is high, as 
suggested above, the ranks of those lacking capacity will include many who do not 
match the stereotype of the helpless and vulnerable.  For this group, these additional 
criteria will be of considerable importance to ensure a meaningful standard of 
confinement.  The needs of the „incapable‟ group may thus vary considerably between 
individuals, and it is not obvious how a set of criteria would be phrased to meet all 
needs. 
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 It is not obvious that the standards of broader law relating to incapacity may 
be introduced unaltered into these areas.  The recent bill on incapacity law published 
by the Department of Constitutional Affairs would allow people in anticipation of 
incapacity to make prospective refusals of medical treatment, and to appoint substitute 
decision-makers.  In the absence of such mechanisms, it stops short of a pure 
substituted judgment test such as applies in some other jurisdictions. It does require 
that regard be had to what the wishes of individuals would have been had they had 
capacity, and among other things also requires consideration of their current, albeit 
incompetent wishes.
47
  Ontario legislation has adopted similar requirements into its 
structures for treatment, with previously expressed wishes regarding treatment being 
binding and a right to appoint alternative decision-makers who are required to decide 
according to a substituted judgment test.
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  Here again, the same rules apply in 
Ontario to psychiatric as to somatic treatment, apparently with reasonable success.  
 
 Admission decisions are a different matter, however.  For example, whatever 
one may think of a dangerousness standard of compulsion, it does seem socially and 
politically unacceptable that an individual lacking capacity who is manifestly 
dangerous to others should be left at large, because they had expressed a firm desire in 
the past not to be admitted to a psychiatric facility.  That would however be the effect 
of applying an approach that allows enforceability of prior wishes or substitute 
judgment to compulsory admissions. The mental incapacity bill would avoid largely 
this difficulty by having a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in making 
decisions for persons lacking capacity.
49
  Outside treatment decisions, where prior 
wishes are binding, the criteria it lists must be considered, but do not determine 
decisions.  The difficulty with this in an admissions context is that a non-exhaustive 
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list means there is no enforceable standard:  there is unfettered discretion as to what 
else may be considered.  For psychiatric confinement, it is difficult to see that this 
could meet the standard of clarity required by the ECHR.  Perhaps for these reasons, 
neither the draft bill nor the Ontario legislation uses a general capacity standard for 
compulsory admission.  Ontario uses dangerousness, and the draft bill specifically 
rules psychiatric compulsion out of its jurisdiction.  At the same time, adopting 
different standards for making decisions in a psychiatric context begins to undercut 
the non-discriminatory nature of the capacity approach, and hence its attraction. It 
further begs the question of what the other criteria for compulsory admission would 
look like. 
 
VI. THE STONE SYSTEM 
 
If the problems of the status quo and capacity are both admitted, how are 
decisions regarding compulsory admission to be made?  One possibility is treatability, 
an option popular with psychiatrists and other physicians since it justifies compulsion 
by reference to the services offered by those professionals.  Here again, however, 
some formula is necessary to take into account the intrusiveness of the intervention, 
that nature of potentially adverse effects and the right of patients to autonomy in the 
absence of reason to the contrary. 
 
 The system developed by American psychiatrist Alan Stone in the mid-1970s 
warrants consideration, as it is an attempt to integrate therapeutics with an awareness 
of patient rights.
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 In Stone‟s system, confinement would be available only if the 
following criteria were met: 
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A reliable diagnosis of severe mental disorder had been made 
 
The immediate prognosis was one of major distress 
 
An effective treatment existed 
 
The patient must offer incompetent refusal of treatment 
 
The proposed treatment must be such that the reasonable patient would 
consent. 
 
Stone‟s system has much to recommend it.  It focuses on the needs of and medical 
possibilities for the specific patient.  It acknowledges the right of a competent patient 
to refuse treatment, but does not use capacity to consent to psychiatric admission as 
the controller of such admission.  Instead he offers a selection of criteria related to the 
severity of the disorder and the availability and reasonableness of treatment to 
determine whether the admission takes place.  The requirements relating to reliability 
of diagnosis and efficacy of proposed treatment require reasonable medical standards.  
The requirements of severe mental disorder and prognosis of major distress include a 
threshold of weight and urgency to the patient‟s condition, implicitly acknowledging 
that intervention has its costs and must only be undertaken in situations of some 
necessity.  The requirement that the reasonable patient would consent allows 
consideration of a variety of factors, including those such as adverse effects that 
would disincline a patient to consent to the treatment.   
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 The wording seems clear enough to provide an applicable standard as to who 
may be compelled.  As with any statutory framework, the language of these criteria is 
„open-textured‟, that is, subject to interpretation around the edges.  How severe is 
„severe‟, how major is „major‟, and how effective is „effective‟, for example?  While 
it might be appropriate to consider whether marginal re-phrasing can limit these 
ambiguities, no phrasing will eliminate them entirely.  The phrasing above does have 
the advantage that it would be broadly understandable to the professionals who would 
be primarily in charge of its application.  The final criterion however re-enforces the 
need for some form of consideration removed from the medical officer responsible for 
the individual‟s treatment.  The risk is this criterion otherwise becomes self-fulfilling, 
as it is difficult to imagine doctors prescribing treatment to which in their view a 
reasonable patient would object.  This was in fact the result in Hoge‟s 1989 study of 
the criteria, where for a total of 483 patients, not a single doctor considered that the 
reasonable patient would refuse the treatment the doctor proposed.
51
  This criterion is 
however of particular significance, as it is here that potential problems of the 
proposed treatment such as adverse effects enter the equation.  It is therefore not 
necessarily obvious that the „reasonable patient‟ would have shared the doctor‟s self-
assessment as to the desirability of consent. 
 
The obvious solution to these problems is an initial routine consideration of 
cases by an independent arbiter.  This would allow a second opinion on the 
applicability of the open-textured language, and a view independent of the treating 
physician as to the approach of a reasonable patient. The routine nature of the review 
is particularly important in this case, since the fact that ex hypothesi the individual is 
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thought by the admitting physician to lack treatment capacity increases the likelihood 
that they will also be unable to ensure that the relevant standards are met. This in turn 
of course increases the financial costs of the system, although the degree of increase is 
a matter of speculation, since some form of review process would be necessary for 
any set of criteria.   
 
 Stone‟s criteria were not drafted with more recent concerns of advance 
treatment refusal or substituted judgment in mind, although there is no reason why 
they could not be factored into the system.  This would presumably be with a gloss on 
the clause relating to incompetent treatment refusal.  
 
 The close association of the Stone criteria with treatability of the disorder is 
both its advantage and its problem.  As with some of the capacity-related criteria 
discussed above, it would not necessarily allow intervention in the case of the 
manifestly dangerous person with a mental disorder.  Persons who could not be 
treated to the standard noted, or who offered a competent refusal of the treatment, 
would remain at large. This is not necessarily an argument against Stone.  Instead, it 
must be asked whether we should intervene in these circumstances. 
 
VII. DANGEROUSNESS:  A SECOND LOOK 
 
In some cases at least, there is at least a coherent argument in that we should 
intervene in the case of the dangerous person with mental disorder.  Dangerousness is 
not a stranger to the English legal psychiatric landscape.  Precedent back to the 
sixteenth century allows confinement of „lunatics‟ to restrain them from killing or 
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doing mischief such as setting fire to a house.
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  The standard continued through the 
nineteenth century, most famously re-stated by Chief Baron Sir Frederick Pollock in 
Nottidge v. Ripley.
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  The resonances of this continue to the present time.  Thus the 
nearest relative‟s right to obtain the release of an individual is restricted when the 
patient is „likely to act in a manner dangerous to other persons or to himself‟,54 and 
references to safety of the public are contained in the existing admission criteria, as 
noted above.   
 
The prime objection to the dangerousness standard appears to be that it is 
prospective.  The critics of the government‟s draft mental health bill tend to assume 
that the actual commission of a criminal offence would justify confinement, but until 
the actual commission of the offence, the law should not intervene.  Yet this must be a 
red herring, in the sense that it is not clear what criminality of an action adds to the 
action itself.  Consider for example an individual yelling aggressively and brandishing 
a knife.  To ensure an appropriate standard, we would presumably wish an 
appropriately serious crime to have been committed to justify confinement.  No 
homicide or battery is committed unless the individual actually stabs someone.  No 
assault is committed unless someone feels threatened, a factor which may be effected 
by apparently arbitrary factors such as how fast the brandisher can run relative to 
passers by, or whether a fence separates the brandisher from passers by.  Unless we 
are to divorce the law of confinement from the condition of the potential patient 
entirely, it seems bizarre to decide confinement on such arbitrary bases. It makes 
more sense to consider the actions, rather than the legal question of criminality, and 
the likelihood that the action will occur.   
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The use of a dangerousness standard on its own does allow the possibility that 
some people will be admitted to psychiatric facilities for whom curative treatment 
may be unavailable.  How far should that sway us from the standard?  The reality is 
that if intervention is justified, the people must go somewhere.  Prison is not an 
appropriate option, if the individual has committed no crime: our object for those with 
mental disabilities is surely not punishment.  Persons with, for example, treatment-
resistant mental illnesses may already be housed in psychiatric facilities, so it seems 
difficult to argue that the nature of the institution is of itself unsuited.  Indeed, the 
more general notion of a hospital as only a place of cure is of itself problematic, as 
people with incurable physical disorders may remain in hospital if there is no other 
suitable place for them.  This is obviously not an ideal solution for the individuals in 
question, but it would seem that it is not necessarily contrary to social policy. 
 
 This is not necessarily an argument for a dangerousness standard, for 
prediction is difficult.  Decisions based on the impressions of psychiatric 
professionals are roundly criticised as inaccurate, sometimes little better than chance. 
More formalised systems are often based on criteria such as race, sex, age, or social 
class.  These raise obvious human rights problems.  How would we defend a system 
where the decision to confine was based, even if only in part, on the basis that an 
individual was black, male, young or poor?   
 
 Even with the best systems, predictions are only predictions. The most 
extensive trial has been recently completed in the United States, by the MacArthur 
project.
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 Their strongest statistics involved 939 people, at several sites.  Of these 176 
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were in fact violent over the course of the study.  Using a variety of criteria in 
combination, they were able to arrive at five risk bands, summarised below: 
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Table 1
56
 
Risk 
Class 
Number of 
Cases in 
Class 
Percent of 
class 
violent 
Number of 
people 
violent 
Percentage of total 
violent people 
contained in this 
class 
Number of 
people not 
violent in class 
1 343 1.2 4 2 341 
2 248 7.7 19 11 237 
3 183 26.2 48 27 135 
4 102 55.9 57 32 45 
5 63 76.2 48 27 15 
 
Even in the highest risk category, therefore, almost one in four of the sample was not 
violent in the following year.  A compulsion standard based on membership in risk 
class 5 would still wrongly compel one person in four, a ration that must cause 
concern given the extremity of the legal powers provided to the psychiatric system.  
Even with such a high proportion of wrongful compulsions, only 27 per cent of 
persons who would be violent within a year would be caught.  Increasing the 
proportion of violent people admitted of course also increases the proportion of 
people admitted who are not violent.  To catch more than half of violent people, class 
4 would have to be included.  That would mean 60 people, or 36 per cent of the 165 
people admitted, would not turn out to be violent, and so on up the chart. 
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 It should be emphasised that the McArthur study is the best predictor 
available; adoption of other criteria will yield a statistically worse result.  McArthur 
itself is, however, as yet too complex to be used in a clinical setting.   
 
 The standards of dangerousness contained in the draft mental health bill are 
exceptionally badly drafted.  The relevant criteria are contained in clause 6(4) of the 
bill: 
 
6(4) The third condition is – 
 
(a) in the case of patient who is at substantial risk of causing serious harm to 
other persons, that it is necessary for the protection of those persons that 
medical treatment be provided to him, and 
(b) in any other case, that – 
(i) it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or the 
protection of other persons that medical treatment be provided to 
him, and 
(ii) that treatment cannot be provided to him unless he is subject to the 
provisions of this Act. [italics added] 
 
Not merely is there no indication as to how dangerousness is to be ascertained, it is 
not even really clear what the clause means.  A patient who is „at substantial risk of 
causing harm to other persons‟ in sub-clause (a) is to be treated under compulsion 
even if the compulsion is not necessary.  Quite why this unnecessary compulsion is 
justifiable is at best highly questionable, and if such rational argument fails to result in 
CapacityandDangerousness.MedLR.dft.doc - 35 - 
the implosion of this clause, recourse may be had to law.  The Winterwerp decision 
allows the detention of persons of unsound mind under Article V of the ECHR only if 
they suffer from a mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement.
57
  It is difficult to see that such a standard can be met in cases when 
detention is not „necessary‟. Such unnecessary confinement is further expressly 
disallowed by the decision in Witold Litwa v. Poland, where the ECtHR states: 
 
The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified 
where other, less severe measures have been considered and found to be 
insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which might require 
that the person concerned be detained. That means that it does not suffice that 
the deprivation of liberty is executed in conformity with national law but it 
must also be necessary in the circumstances.
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Also problematic is how this clause (a) group compares to those who are 
compelled under clause (b) „for the protection of other persons‟.  Protected from what, 
if not „substantial risk of serious harm‟, yet as they are in a separate sub-clauses, with 
sub-clause (b) having the additional requirement in (ii), those identified in sub-clause 
(b) must be broader than sub-clause (a).  Are we to understand that someone may fall 
under the (b) criteria even if the risk of harm were non-substantial or if the harm itself 
not serious?  That is sufficiently absurd that it cannot be what the government intends, 
but it is the only consistent reading of the criteria. In the unlikely event that it is what 
the government intends, it raises the same ECHR points as those under clause (a), 
above. 
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All that said, as noted previously, it does seem an unnerving result that we 
would be able to leave manifestly dangerous people with mental disorders at large, 
even if for example they were unaware of their own dangerousness.  If it were agreed, 
as argued above, that one need not wait for an actual criminal injury prior to 
intervention, is it possible to draft a statute which meets that standard?  Ontario‟s 
statute seems a serious attempt: 
 
 
15(1)  Where a physician examines a person and has reasonable cause to 
believe that the person, 
 
(a) has threatened or attempted or is threatening or attempting to cause 
bodily harm to himself or herself; 
(b) has behaved or is behaving violently towards another person or has 
caused or is causing another person to fear bodily harm from him or 
her; or 
(c) has shown or is showing a lack of competence to care for himself or 
herself 
 
and if in addition the physician is of the opinion that the person is 
apparently suffering from mental disorder of a nature or quality that 
likely will result in, 
 
(d) serious bodily harm to the person; 
(e) serious bodily harm to another person; or 
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(f) serious physical impairment of the person 
 
the physician may make application in the prescribed form for a 
psychiatric assessment of the person.
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This section specifies danger in terms of the nature and degree of the potential injury, 
but also requires precipitating events in order to justify intervention.  On its face, it 
would seem to require cogent and immediate reasons based in the actual behaviour of 
the potential patient to authorise intervention.  If the decision is that a dangerousness 
standard is the appropriate way forward, it is this sort of specificity that should be 
required.   
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The government has done itself no favours in the consultation process 
surrounding mental health reform.  It appointed an expert committee whose report it 
largely ignored.  Instead, it set forth its proposals in fashions apparently designed by 
spin doctors to placate a perceived moral panic rather than making an intellectually 
coherent case for its views.  While content to ride the wave of concern over risks of 
allegedly dangerous patients, it consistently failed to acknowledge the fact that rates 
of homicide related to mental disorder have been falling for many years.
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 It therefore 
completely ignored the efforts of those in the system who achieved that result.  
Statements such as „Care and treatment should involve the least degree of compulsion 
that is consistent with ensuring that the objectives of the [treatment] plan are met‟61   
would inevitably be read as „compulsion will be no more than necessary, to ensure 
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that the patients do what they are told‟ – an approach hardly likely to endear it to 
those believing in patient rights.  If the government had set out to alienate, it is 
difficult to see that it could have done a better job. 
 
 If the furore is in retrospect tiresomely predictable, it does not make the 
problem go away.  We need a new Mental Health Act, and our choice is between a 
variety of standards and approaches, all of which have their problems.  It is time for 
the government to have the debate about real options, and for people in the mental 
health policy community to engage with those real options. 
 
My own view, subject to the arguments that may arise in those debates, is that 
we should ensure that incapacity is the criterion for compulsory treatment.  We should 
further maintain the existing rule that those lacking capacity to make admission 
decisions based on a low threshold of capacity should be admitted on some form of 
best interests test.  As we have seen, decisions regarding capacity for psychiatric 
admission do not divide neatly from broader questions of capacity, so this standard 
belongs in the new Incapacity Act, not in specialised mental health legislation.  To 
meet ECHR requirements of clarity, that threshold may require more express 
articulation than is currently the case.
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  Such clarification is desirable in any event, to 
ensure that the threshold remains low.   
 
Capacity cannot, however, provide the sole legal framework for psychiatric 
detention, and the other criteria we adopt will prove problematic.  They will be 
specific to people with mental disabilities and will therefore, in a sense, be inherently 
discriminatory against that group of people.  That is distasteful, but as we have seen, 
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adoption of a capacity test simpliciter will result in an irresistible pressure to raise the 
threshold of capacity, removing rights from the very people our anti-discriminatory 
policy aims to empower.   
 
What should the additional criteria look like?  Here, the ineptitude of the 
government in managing the reform process should not blind us to the merits of its 
approach.  The question is when social control is justified in a psychiatric crisis.  
Dangerousness provides a standard where the public interest in intervention is clear, 
and a properly drafted dangerousness standard may provide the best way forward.  
The government‟s approach may therefore be the right one; but a shame about the 
drafting.  If that is the case, the way forward is to engage in a serious debate as to 
what a proper dangerousness standard should look like.  The Ontario legislation 
provides a good starting point for discussion. 
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